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Robert L. Kidder and Setsuo Miyazawa
Japan's reputation for unusually strong emphasis on the avoidance of
public conflict and therefore for deemphasis of legal institutions suggests an
arid, hostile environment for litigators, especially those who lack substantial
resources. In a study of a quasi-class action lawsuit by Japanese air pollution
victims, we find that litigation can be developed as a tool in the pursuit of a
social movement's wider objectives despite the paucity of resources within the
Japanese legal system. Our research documents the many ways in which the
delays, obstacles, and costs that characterize the litigation environment in
Japan have been either neutralized or turned to the advantage of a social
movement because of its commitment to longer-term political objectives rather
than short-term victories. The special role of professions in general, and the
legal profession in particular, in such litigation combines with class-oriented
social movements to produce a political/legal pattern that is neither tradition-
ally harmonious nor a conflict "difficult to contain."
When a large group of Japanese air pollution "victims" files suit
against the national government and major industrial organizations, how
did they reach that decision, what do they want, what conditions will af-
fect their court outcomes, and what effect will the law-centered experience
have on their lives as individuals and as members of a social movement?
We address these basic questions in this study. We will also consider their
implications for broader issues of law in society generally and law in Japan
specifically. Because our approach is comparative, and because the Japa-
nese legal context of this lawsuit is important in producing the answers to
our questions, we begin with a review of the context which an American
group with similar pollution problems might face.
Robert I. Kidder is a professor in the Department of Sociology at Temple University.
Setsuo Miyazawa is on the Faculty of Law of Kobe University.
© 1993 American Bar Foundation.
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Environmental social movements in the United States are often sub-
sets of broader movements for social change. Typically these movements
include litigation as one means of furthering their goals. Some defendants
are private parties whose actions have caused, or threaten, dangers or de-
struction. In other cases, government agencies are sued for failure to en-
force regulations, or as a means of pressuring those agencies to carry out
their responsibilities more assertively.
Environmental activism in the U.S. has tended to coalesce into na-
tionwide organizations such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and the Wild-
life Fund. These mass-membership organizations raise significant resources
to support high-impact litigation. By high-impact litigation, we mean law-
suits in which the object is to obtain judgments, written opinions, and the
attendant publicity from actions of the highest federal courts in order to
set precedents (what Galanter has called "rule development" and the pur-
suit of "rapid and elaborate development of the doctrinal law")' that will
alter the behavior of polluters all over the country. In other words, in
addition to pressing legislatures to write environment-friendly laws, anti-
pollution organizations regularly use the courts to produce social change
through court-centered precedent.2
Community groups who wish to attack a specific local environmental
problem can seek one or more of these nationwide organizations to act as
a champion. The organizations respond selectively, taking on those "cli-
ents" with "significant" cases-those in which successful litigation will
produce both good publicity and valuable new precedent.
With numerous environmental-protection laws already passed by
both the federal and state levels, local activists are well armed with a gener-
ally favorable legal climate for action. This remains true even in the face of
a fluctuating political and administrative environment. Nevertheless, as
previous research has repeatedly shown, laws are not self-enforcing and
regulatory laws in particular depend on factors such as the limited re-
sources allocated to regulators, the political inclinations of the administra-
tion for which they work, and the changing structures and mechanisms of
control.3 Hence the majority of environmental actions in recent years has
1. Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change," 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 112 (1974).
2. According to Percy Luney, a board member of the Environmental Defense Fund,
many environmental groups in the United States now prefer negotiations over litigation.
The National Environmental Policy Act allows such organizations to participate in regula-
tory procedures.
3. See S. Cohen, "The Punitive City: Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control," 3
Contemp. Crisis 339 (1979); Richard L. Abel, "The Contradictions of Informal Justice" in
Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice (New York: Academic Press, 1982) ("Abel, Politics");
Boaventura de Souza Santos, "Law and Community: The Changing Nature of State Power
in Late Capitalism," in Abel, Politics; Pat O'Malley, "Regulating Contradictions: The Aus-
tralian Press Council and the 'Dispersal of Social Control,'" 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 83 (1987);
Jonathan Simon, "The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices," 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 771
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been centered on using litigation to enforce existing laws. An example is
the use of regulations requiring "environmental impact studies" to be per-
formed before new development projects can be started. Courts have be-
come the center of battles over the protection of one or another
''endangered species" such as the Snail Darter fish in Tennessee or the
Northern Spotted Owl in the Northwest where the cutting of forests is
being contested.
In the United States, therefore, localized pollution initiatives arise
and exist within a nationwide ecology of mobilized resources including
networks of supporters and activists who use litigation at various levels as
part of their strategy for environmental protection. Their actions are sup-
ported not only by thousands of voluntary donors, both individual and
corporate, who support environmentalism in general, but also by the large
number of activist lawyers who are available to work full time on environ-
ment-related issues. For U.S. activists, there is an abundance of legal re-
sources, and these resources have become incorporated into the long-term
strategies of environmental activism.
In this article, we will use a case study to compare this American pat-
tern with research results on antipollution activism and litigation in Japan.
Among social scientists, Japan is known for two factors that are relevant to
this research: its unfortunate position as a pioneer in pollution experience
in the Minamata disease cases; 4 and its reputation as a society with a cul-
turally based aversion to dependence on the law and courts. Our research
focuses on the relationship between Japan's scarce legal resources and the
strategies of social mobilization used by environmental activists.
For decades, social scientists have tended to rely on culture as an in-
dependent variable explaining all sorts of differences between Japan and
other industrialized societies. Japan's low rates of litigation and the "un-
derdevelopment" of its legal institutions have been no exception.
Kawashima's discussion of the legal system is one of the best-known Eng-
lish-language treatments of culture-based analyses.5 In brief, the culture-
based hypothesis is that the traditional Japanese esteem for harmony and
institutions expressing that value system have made legal institutions and
procedures aesthetically unpalatable and functionally unnecessary. Cul-
ture, they argue, supports functional alternatives to legal structures that
(1988); Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, "Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six
Urban Jurisdictions," 25 Law & Soc'y Rev. 117 (1991); Ian Ayers & John Braithwaite,
"Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment," 16 Law & Soc. Inquiry 435 (1991).
4. See Frank Upham, Law and Social Change in Post-War Japan (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1987) ("Upham, Law in Post-War Japan"); for a complete chronol-
ogy of Japan's history of pollution problems and related social actions, see Nobuko Iijima,
ed., Pollution Japan: Historical Chronology (Tokyo: Asahi Evening News, 1979).
5. Takeyoshi Kawashima, "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan," in A. T. von
Mehren, ed., Law in Japan: The Legal Order of a Changing Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1963) ("Kawashima, 'Dispute Resolution' ").
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have developed in the West. More recent versions of this thesis deal with
apology6 and with the social psychology of justice.
7
Other research on connections between law and society in Japan has
challenged these culture-based explanations for Japan's legal "un-
derdevelopment" and the relative infrequency of Japanese litigation. One
type of challenge emphasizes relationships between different elements of
Japan's elite, the emphasis of postwar Japanese leaders on rapid economic
expansion, and conditions affecting the success of interest groups in trans-
forming their local problems into issues of broader import.8 This approach
depicts the Japanese love of harmony as a useful myth by which a power
elite justifies deliberate suppression of growth of legal institutions. Other
studies make a similar point by demonstrating the economic rationality of
Japanese decision making about whether or not to litigate, given institu-
tional contexts, including the high costs of lawyers and litigation, which
make settlement strategies measurably less expensive than litigation.9 In
both of these versions, the law-averse behavior of ordinary Japanese citi-
zens becomes "rational" because it reflects decisions that make sense from
a self-interested viewpoint within the confines of the socioeconomic struc-
tures that determine opportunities in Japan.
Regardless of theory, most observers agree that Japan stands out as a
rare exception to the trend toward legalization in industrial and postindus-
trial societies. Social movements addressing environmental issues face a
very different legal landscape from that which most Americans have come
to take for granted. If America is a legal jungle, Japan is a desert. The story
we tell here represents a "negative case"--a group of people who are using
the legal system, who are confronting their opponents in court, who, in
other words, are apparently not obeying the unwritten rules of Japanese
culture. In our report, we will show how people in Japanese social move-
ments adjust to and use the scarce legal resources and the opportunities
6. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, "The Implications of Apology: Law and Cul-
ture in Japan and the United States," 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 461 (1986).
7. V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Everyday Justice: Responsibility and the Individual
in Japan and the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992) ("Hamilton
& Sanders, Everyday Justice"). In their book, Hamilton and Sanders go well beyond the
references earlier in linking cultural factors to those of social structure. Still, their analysis
tends to treat the attitude differences they find as an important causal factor in retarding the
development of legal institutions in Japan.
8. Margaret McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1981); Upham, Law in Post-War Japan; Setsuo Miyazawa, "Social
Movements and Contemporary Rights in Japan: Relative Success Factors in the Field of
Environmental Law," 22 Kobe U. L Rev. 63 (1988); John 0. Haley, "The Myth of the Reluc-
tant Litigant," 4 J. Japanese Stud. 359 (1978).
9. Takao Tanase, "The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensa-
tion in Japan," 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 651 (1990); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato,
"The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan," 18 J. Legal Stud.
263 (1989).
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found at the oases of this "legal desert." We will also address the changes
that litigation may produce in social movements which do go to court.
In the late 1980s 482 residents of Kojoshi [pseudonym], an industrial
suburb of a major Japanese metropolitan center, filed a multibillion yen
lawsuit against nine local companies, the national government of Japan,
and a public highway corporation. In addition to damages (various lung
diseases) stemming from air pollution, they demanded injunctive orders to
keep below specific levels sulfur dioxide from the defendant companies
and nitrogen dioxide from the highway passing through their area.10 Their
indirect purpose in demanding these orders is to force the government to
reinstate a previously established compensation system that the national
government had used to deal with the pollution crisis of the late 196 0s.
How did this citizen action come about? How is it organized? What does it
tell us about "access to justice" in the Japanese legal system and the rela-
tionship between Japanese legal institutions and social movements? The
general objective of the research we report here has been to situate this
lawsuit sociologically in the formation and evolution of the particular so-
cial movement from which it has sprung. To the extent that it may be
more than just an idiosyncratic case, it may tell us something more general
about law and social movements in Japan. In the process, the research may
also provide some answers for broader questions about law and social
movements in general. With respect to the debate over culture versus
other explanatory schemes, we will try to show the inadequacy of a reli-
ance on culture to explain this case.
LITIGATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Until Japan began planned industrial development, Kojoshi was a
quiet fishing village. Everything changed when national government chose
the whole region as a new heavy industry development zone. Like its
neighboring towns in both directions along the seacoast, Kojoshi was
quickly transformed into a sprawling center for smokestack industries such
as steel, glass, and power generation. By the 1930s it was a predominantly
industrial area in which pollution of various kinds was probably already
producing health problems.
Kojoshi is now a city of about 600,000 people. It is divided between a
relatively affluent section "across the tracks" and outside the prevailing
drift of the city's oceanside regiments of smokestacks, and the other half
that routinely receives the pollutants issuing from those stacks. This
"other half" is a relentlessly industrial area, with a few very large factories
10. For a more detailed description of the legal issues involved in this case, see the
appendix.
610 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
and hundreds of much smaller ones scattered in among the working-class
neighborhoods. The area merges indistinguishably with similar industrial
strips on either side of it.
Air pollution in Kojoshi has led a large group of residents to conclude
that litigation is rational, that the group needs to confront both private
industry and government with public legal action. These lawsuits therefore
represent the nonharmonious option which is not consistent with the Jap-
anese ideology of consensus, the culture of Wa. Is this action an aberra-
tion, just a peculiar local outburst? Or does it contain elements that tell us
something new about the relationship between "the people" and the Japa-
nese legal system, about factors that Japan shares with other industrialized
legal systems, and therefore about more global patterns of response to en-
vironmental problems through legal activity? In particular, how do the
structural restrictions on development of law in Japan affect the strategies
these plaintiffs use to achieve their goals?
METHODS
The research reported here is largely based on interviews conducted
by the authors with those involved in this litigation on the side of the
plaintiffs. We have interviewed those lawyers who are involved as "active"
advocates in the preparation and presentation of the case, leaders of the
plaintiffs' organization and leaders of the more inclusive victims' organiza-
tion from which the plaintiffs were drawn, and an opportunistically drawn
(not random) sample of plaintiffs. We have accompanied lawyers during
their interviews of plaintiffs in their homes and conducted our own inter-
views of those and other plaintiffs. We have also interviewed two doctors
and a high school science teacher who originally helped define Kojoshi's
problem as a case of air pollution and the doctor who has treated more
than half of the plaintiffs.
In addition to interviews, we have studied the publicity material dis-
tributed by the victims' organization and the plaintiffs' organization, and
the stories about their actions and the progress of the litigation which
have appeared in both Japanese and English language papers and on
television.
THE KOJOSHI CASE
The Kojoshi litigants are a subset of "certified victims" of sulfur diox-
ide pollution in Kojoshi. Victims obtained their "certified" status begin-
ning in 1970 through a coincidence of their own efforts and major changes
in the policies of the national government. The origins of "victim con-
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sciousness" and certification include both local action and external influ-
ence. Beginning in the late 1960s, various Kojoshi residents became
concerned about the high incidence of respiratory disease, especially
among Kojoshi's children. Emphysema, bronchitis, and asthma were all
higher than local doctors thought normal. These doctors communicated
their concern to parents and began helping a few of them to investigate
causes. To do this, they felt they needed to measure the extent of the
problem, and this required contacting other parents. With the help of lo-
cal science teachers who sought the source of the problem with crude ex-
periments, and local doctors who helped organizers track the geographic
pattern of disease, they identified the problem as air pollution and traced
it to local factories. The epidemiological phase thus involved actions
which, in retrospect, were well-suited to the formation of a social
movement.
The timing here is important because it is simultaneous with the cli-
max of the "Big Four" pollution cases (Minamata, Yokkaichi, Niigata, and
Toyama),' t which had captured the nation's (and eventually the world's)
attention and prodded the national government into dramatic antipollu-
tion action. Thus, just as the "big" cases were pressing the national gov-
ernment to enact enlightened new environmental standards, groups of
Kojoshi citizens were putting together their own homemade version of a
pollution case.
The specific channel by which the idea of air pollution entered this
local scene appears to be through a local doctor who innocently welcomed
a group of medical students on a study tour from Tokyo. In his own words,
before the arrival of the students, he had always considered Kojoshi's
smokestacks and soot to be "a symbol of progress and achievement.. ., an
object of pride for the community." But the students arrived with a letter
from their professor questioning the doctor about diseases in his town that
might be related to air pollution. He relates that this was the first time he
ever considered the possibility that the air might be dangerous. Yet it was
from this seed of doubt that the doctor began his own investigations and
began to communicate his doubts to his patients, some of whom became
the nucleus of the new movement.
This growing group of local residents persuaded the city government
to institute a system for the compensation of air pollution victims. The
municipal program began operation in 1970, just prior to the introduction
of a nationwide compensation program for pollution zones "designated"
by the national government. The national program involved a tax on in-
dustrial polluters which was used to create a compensatory fund for "certi-
fied" pollution victims in many industrial towns including Kojoshi. Its
11. See Upham, Law in Post.War Japan, and McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen
Politics in Japan.
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purpose was not to punish polluters, nor even to force an end to pollution,
but rather to help those who suffered its effects. Since the pollution tax
was calibrated to the level of pollution output, the program was expected
to gradually reduce pollution in response to economic incentives. How-
ever, the primary thrust of the program was support for those who suf-
fered from the pollution. To become "certified" as a victim, one had to
prove residence in a designated polluted area for at least a year and present
symptoms of one of four classes of respiratory disease (emphysema,
asthma, asthmatic bronchitis, and bronchial asthma). Kojoshi was in-
cluded in the first group of "designated areas."
A special characteristic of this program is that "victims" need not
demonstrate a direct causal relationship between any one polluter and
their own contraction of disease. Nor do "victims" have to prove a causal
link between the pollutants and their disease. Liability of polluters is col-
lective and causality is assumed. The primary agent of pollution-caused
disease has been identified as sulfur dioxide.
Currently, nearly 11,000 Kojoshi residents are certified as "victims,"
with level of disease severity determining the level of compensation they
receive from the fund. Simultaneous with their efforts to gain certification,
a majority of the victims formed into civic associations using volunteer
help and contributions from the city to develop a social service network
for victims and their families. By the time we began interviewing in the
spring of 1989, the organization involved in the litigation was operating 16
neighborhood-based offices scattered about the city to bring services for
victims and their families close to home.'
2
Beginning with legislative moves in 1980, the national government
has been moving to curtail its compensation program, starting with legisla-
tion to narrow the range of eligibility for victim certification and reduce
the financial burden placed on the polluting industries. The pace and
scope of this reduction grew more intense in 1983, and the victims' associ-
ation began looking for ways, including political action and litigation, to
ensure the continuation of the program. In 1987, however, government
support was cut sharply. The Pollution Health Damage Compensation Act
was amended, terminating certification of new victims. In effect, the ruling
party and relevant agencies have declared sulfur dioxide pollution a thing
of the past. 13 The policy change clearly came in response to pressure from
12. Many victims literally cannot walk a couple of blocks to shop at their neighbor-
hood stores. The exertion leaves them breathless. Hence, many depend on the social service
network of the victims' association to allow them to continue living at home.
13. Sulfur dioxide pollution has been significantly reduced throughout Japan, though
not eliminated entirely. Kojoshi victim leaders and their lawyers confess in private that they
know sulfur dioxide is no longer such a problem, but they continue to press the issue for
two reasons: first, to keep up pressure on the government to care well for those who have
already fallen prey to sulfur dioxide; and, second, to strengthen their hand in dealing with
the more significant contemporary pollution threat from nitrogen dioxide emissions from
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industrial leaders to eliminate the competitive disadvantages of regulatory
burdens on industry. To make this pill more palatable to the general pub-
lic, government simultaneously created a fund for research and other pre-
ventive measures using contributions from industries. Besides the victims
themselves, many local governments opposed this amendment.
The Kojoshi victims' lawsuit, filed in December 1988, was mostly a
response to this policy change. It demands injunctive orders to reduce air
pollution caused by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide to specific maxi-
mum levels. Further, it demands nearly 12 billion yen (about $92 million)
in damages to the victims. The suit is intended to place indirect pressure
on the government to reinstate the compensation system by legally con-
firming the existence of a large number of uncompensated victims. While
the repealed compensation system did not deal with nitrogen dioxide emit-
ted from cars traveling on a highway built 15 years ago, the suit demands
an injunctive order on nitrogen dioxide as well because the highway sys-
tem is now the more significant polluter of Kojoshi.
A "team" of 218 lawyers was formed. Forty of these are "active" in
the case, and the rest have consented to be listed as a show of support for
the case. Seven to 10 of them work on the lawsuit more or less full time.
Most of these active lawyers work in law firms that are of medium size by
Japanese standards (6-12 members), and it is quite clear that their largely
uncompensated work on these cases is being subsidized by the other, more
lucrative work being done in these firms.
The litigants' organization has evolved into a quite sophisticated so-
cial movement. It prints and distributes glossy brochures (some in both
Japanese and English) detailing their case for continued support, it pro-
duces a publicity campaign involving public speeches and articles for news-
paper and television coverage, and it operates a permanent litigation office
near the district court where the lawsuit is being heard, with a staff that
works on the litigation full time, stores records, and maintains computer
contact with legal directories. Lawyers' fees have been minimal thus far,
and lawyers we have interviewed expect most of their work to be uncom-
pensated. Support for the lawyers and for the organization's litigation of-
fice is produced by a monthly "membership" fee charged each litigant.
Both lawyers and victims agree that final judgments in the courts are
not likely to come earlier than around 1998, at least 10 years after initial
filing of the case. In the 3 years since the case was filed, more than 20 of
the litigants have died.' 4
automobiles. Automobile pollution has risen sharply in most urban areas and constitutes a
special threat in Kojoshi because of the 16-lane expressway built through the heart of the
area.
14. This figure has been revised upward every time we have conducted interviews for
this project.
614 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
LITIGATION IN CONTEXT: ACTION NETWORKS
The facts outlined above are the bare bones of the case history. We
have told it as though litigation were the logical culmination of events. It is
the kind of description one might have seen some years ago in an article
on "access to justice," with the emphasis on the severe handicaps faced by
these victims because of inadequacies in the Japanese legal system. As de-
scribed, with the delays involved, it also might be taken as additional evi-
dence in support of Hamilton and Sanders's psychocultural argument that
"[]ack of [legal] alternatives--essentially lack of a 'court of last resort'-
can contribute to endless controversy" in cultures that, like that of Japan,
"do not look to the courts for an acceptable resolution to conflict." 1
5
Our research, however, leads us to view both of these approaches as
inadequate for understanding this situation. In the face of restricted "ac-
cess to justice," a determined social movement can turn barriers into a
positive element of strategy for precisely those who "suffer" most from
"deficient" legal resources. The scarcity of legal resources does not neces-
sarily stifle grass-roots social movements in their efforts to pursue justice
and social change, though the scarcity may significantly restrict opportuni-
ties for the individuals who make up the movement. Instead, the scarcity
of legal resources can be factored into a social movement's calculations and
become a source for its revitalization as well as the basis for maintenance
of control over the movement's direction. Rather than exemplifying what
Hamilton and Sanders see as a general "difficulty of containment" of con-
flict,16 we believe the continuing chain of events in these pollution cases
represents a quite highly scripted pattern of conflict that only appears to
be "uncontained" because its unfolding is not significantly governed by
decisive judicial action. Nor should the duration of this activity be taken as
evidence of the kind of structureless floundering that is implied in Hamil-
ton and Sanders's expression, "endless controversy."17 The controversy
may be long-lived, but a better label for it would be "sustained
opposition."
Our interviews show that participants in the formation of the victims'
organization in Kojoshi already had, or later developed, contacts with peo-
ple in other areas where pollution was becoming an issue. We know also
that they were aware of some details of the "Big Four" pollution lawsuits.
Some of the leadership of Kojoshi's victims' organization participated in
15. Hamilton & Sanders, Everyday Justice 215 (cited in note 7), argue that social sys-
tems lacking in legal resources may be "fragile" because they lack the means to absorb con-
flict through means other than reliance on norms of harmony. Hence, they say, when
conflict does break out in a "harmonious" culture, it is likely to be difficult to contain, to be
unnecessarily protracted, and to involve unpredictable battles.
16. Id. at 214.
17. Id. at 215.
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the "study groups" of victims' organizations in neighboring cities which
were preparing lawsuits similar to the one eventually filed by Kojoshi vic-
tims. This helps to explain the substantial similarity between the defini-
tions of the problem and the actions taken between Kojoshi and other
areas where air pollution activism was emerging, including the "big" one
in Yokkaichi. While there are few if any nationwide organizations in Japan
that compare with the mass movements in other industrialized settings
such as the United States or the European Community, smaller, less con-
spicuous nationwide networks do exist in Japan.
These similarities in the use of litigation did not occur by chance.
Kojoshi victims' leaders have kept themselves well informed about the
often convoluted developments and outcomes of other contemporary law-
suits that are quite similar to their own, and have been in regular contact
with leaders in these other communities. We can directly trace this contact
at least back to the period (the early 1970s) when Kojoshi's organization
was being formed. Kojoshi victims played a part in establishing the Japan
Air Pollution Victims' Association, a national organization that began as a
"liaison group" (renrakukai) with other victims' groups in 1973 and became
a policy-promoting federation eight years later.
In a very recent development, an almost identical lawsuit filed by vic-
tims in Kita-tonari [pseudonym], a "clone" of Kojoshi that was being pol-
luted by Kojoshi's factories but that was located in a separate judicial
jurisdiction, was adjudicated partially in favor18 of the plaintiffs. Filed in
1978 and reaching original-trial adjudication in early 1991, the suit by
about 120 victims resulted in a total award of nearly 400 million yen ($3
million) from the private industries involved, but it failed to hold govern-
ment liable and it failed to impose any controls on auto emissions. Signifi-
cantly for our research on the social movement aspects of this litigation,
about 6,000 demonstrators were present at the district court on the day
the decision was announced, including scores of members from the
Kojoshi victims' organization. They joined the Kita-tonari victims in dem-
onstrations outside the court before the final hearing and went with them
immediately after the "victory" in separate teams to the various corporate
headquarters of the defendant companies to confront their managements
with the demand to avoid further litigation, curtail further pollution, and
apologize to the victims.
Political parties opposed to the ruling Liberal Democratic party have
had an interest in these issues and have had some degree of contact with
18. Like most decisions in these cases, the judgment cannot be easily categorized as a
"victory" or a "defeat" for either side. The amount of the settlement is enough to make
individual participants feel that such cases are worth the effort, but there is also disappoint-
ment about the failure to achieve some of the larger goals. The more highly committed
movement participants scan such decisions not for their immediate payoff but for their
potential for opportunity or threat in pending or future lawsuits in other jurisdictions.
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the victims' organization. In public, the Kojoshi plaintiffs' organization has
worked hard to maintain a nonpartisan stance. For example, among the
many lawyers assisting them, either in name or in practice, in their lawsuit,
the full political spectrum is represented, and active leaders of both the
lawyers' group and the plaintiffs' association say that wide representation
was a specific goal in putting together the lawyers' team. Nevertheless, the
lawyer originally serving as head of the lawyers' team is associated with the
Japan Communist Party, and several of the lawyers involved in this lawsuit
have been active in a variety of other lawsuits involving liberal or "left"
issues such as civil rights for prisoners, illegal immigrants, disabled stu-
dents, and resident Koreans, and issues involving the rights of labor un-
ions. Resident Koreans are Japan's largest minority group and have figured
prominently in recent years in conspicuous demonstrations for fair treat-
ment. Some Kojoshi litigants are resident Koreans, but most are native
Japanese. While it is a distortion to say that the victims' movement is a
tool of one or more political parties, it is fair to say that the broader net-
work supporting this litigation intersects with both the ideologies and or-
ganizations of opposition politics.
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
Our interviews show that organization leaders approached lawyers as
early as 1972 concerning their desire to sue the polluters. Their experience
with local lawyers was almost entirely negative. They did manage to engage
one activist lawyer in the cause. But while "studying" the potential for a
suit, this lawyer became involved in another suit to enjoin the construc-
tion of the very highway which has since become one target in the current
Kojoshi antipollution suit. That lawyer "drifted away" into the highway
case because, according to victim leaders, it seemed too difficult to prove
the causal link in the sulfur dioxide pollution cases, while the proposed
highway, as an obvious "nuisance," was considerably easier to litigate. On
a later occasion, described below, lawyers told Kojoshi victim leaders that a
lawsuit was unjustified, since the government had already established the
compensation system. The picture of victims' experiences with the legal
system thus appears at first to be a classic example of "access denied,"
because of a legal profession reluctant to squander its scarce resources on a
difficult case involving issues they considered to be already settled.
We also know that the victims' current involvement with lawyers and
litigation came about through a combination of chance, determination,
and public shaming. A victim leader was invited to a local bar association
conference where she asked for help in organizing a lawsuit. Turned down,
for the same reasons mentioned above, she took a group of 50 victims to a
meeting of the Young Jurist's League (Seihokyo), a liberal-activist organiza-
Long-Term Strategies in Japanese Environmental Litigation 617
tion which included both judges and lawyers seeking to reform the legal
system. This group, especially a subcommittee of lawyers involved in air
pollution cases in other "designated zones" (including the infamous Mina-
mata mercury poisoning cases), advised her to carry her story to a nation-
wide conference on human rights held by the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (Nichi-benren) in 1985. When she related her story of her
groups' previous negative experience with lawyers, her audience squirmed
with shame, especially those who were lawyers from the district that in-
cludes Kojoshi. Immediately after her speech, she was surrounded by
chagrined lawyers offering free legal representation for members of her or-
ganization. The core of the present lawyers' group was formed on the ipot.
The strategy for the lawsuit was planned in a series of meetings that
culminated in the December 1988 filing of the case.
LITIGATION: OPPORTUNITY AND STRATEGY IN
THE FACE OF SCARCITY
Everyone we have interviewed agreed that, in the context of Japanese
courts, a suit of this kind is likely to take 10 to 12 years before even a first
judgment. The Kita-tonari case, like earlier cases in two other "designated
zones," lasted at least that long.
From an American perspective, such delays appear extraordinary and
suggest a major problem of access. Surely the time and money resources of
the "haves" will advantage them in a battle between ordinary working
class citizens and the government-backed industrial complex of Japan.
Similar delays occur occasionally in some of the largest, most politicized
cases in the United States. But a local case such as Kojoshi's, which has
not received national attention, would be unlikely to face anything close to
a 10-12-year delay, especially in view of the fact that most of the legal
issues involved, and most of the factual questions, are almost identical to
those involved in previously adjudicated cases.
The sources of delay in Japan are legion and can be summed up as a
planned and well-executed government policy to restrict legal resources.
For example, since class action suits are not accepted by Japanese courts,
the Kojoshi action is defined as a large number of similar cases filed at the
same time and handled by the same lawyers. Hence, when Kojoshi plain-
tiffs petitioned to have the usual filing fee (0.5% to 1% of the amount of
the suit) waived because of their inability to pay, the presiding judge de-
cided it was necessary to review every one of the litigants' financial situa-
tions to rule on that preliminary motion for each plaintiff. The process
took more than a year and a half. When that was done, the defendants
appealed the decision on a subset of the cases and succeeded in having
618 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
them added to the list of plaintiffs who would have to pay.19 The appeal, of
course, added several more months to the suit.
Another source of delay is the frequent rotation of judges. Such cases
are heard by a three-judge panel, and when any one of them is reassigned
to another court, the new judge must spend time becoming acquainted
with all the details of each of the 500 "cases." By 1992, one of the judges
involved in the early Kojoshi case hearings had already been transferred
elsewhere.
The most fundamental source of delay may be simply the strict con-
trol that the Japanese government, in cooperation with the major bar as-
sociations, maintains over entry into the legal profession. In 1988,
government policy limited entry into the special training facility that serves
as the gateway to becoming a judge, prosecutor, or private attorney to 500
per year.20 The relatively small profession, on both sides of the bench, is
not designed to grow with demand. Rather the stated aim is to preserve
the highest quality of ethical service that can be achieved through tight
regulation.
Delay is so taken for granted that the lawyers in the Kojoshi case
knew they could wait until well after the start of the lawsuit (spring 1991,
as it turns out) to begin interviewing their clients in detail about their
symptoms. These interviews were needed to be sure that client descrip-
tions of symptoms would conform with the technical terms of the compen-
sation law in question. Such clarification was simply not needed prior to
the filing of the case because the lawyers knew they would have plenty of
time.
Most literature on law-centered dispute processing suggests that ex-
tended delay is likely to deter people from pursuing litigation and that
delay is usually advantageous to only one of the two opposing sides.
It is surprising, therefore, to find that in this case, both sides appear
to see delay as at least partly advantageous to them. Several of the defend-
ant companies in the Kojoshi case are the same as those who "lost" in the
Kita-tonari case. As a plaintiffs' lawyer points out, these defendants know
perfectly well what the Kojoshi plaintiffs will be arguing in their own cases,
because the arguments will be the same as those which brought partial
victory for Kita-tonari plaintiffs. Yet the defendant lawyers in the Kojoshi
case are engaged in exhaustive cross-examination of each Kojoshi plaintiff,
19. All litigants will eventually have to pay something. The issue here was only about
which litigants had enough income to warrant demanding up-front payment rather than
payment deducted from the amount they may "win" at the end of the case. Plaintiff's are
charged a percentage based on the difference between their claim and the final judgment.
Thus, if they "win" 70% of their original claim, they must pay 30% of the litigation fee. If
they "win" only 20% of the claim, they pay 80% of the fee.
20. In 1992, professional organizations and the government agreed to increase this
number from 500 to 700.
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causing further delay, even though everyone in the courtroom knows not
only what the questions will be but what the plaintiffs will answer. Hence
delay appears to be useful to the defendants.
Yet delay also has come to figure in the plaintiffs' lawyers' strategies
for maintaining commitment and a sense of progress among the victims. A
new group of plaintiffs has been added to the original group of 500. The
purpose is only partly to compensate for the attrition of original plaintiffs
and to increase pressure on the defendants. In addition, as the lawyers'
team sees it, the action helps to recharge the determination and commit-
ment of the original plaintiffs. It helps to "maintain a sense of momen-
tum," in one lawyer's words.2
1
Evidently the risk of lost momentum, lost commitment, is a matter of
concern among the plaintiffs' lawyers and movement leaders in this case as
it has been in other cases. This difficulty is one major reason why a pecu-
liar "deal" between plaintiffs and defendants' attorneys has become a stan-
dard feature of such suits. Plaintiffs and defendants have agreed that if a
money judgment is made in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants will im-
mediately (in court before anyone leaves) sign and hand over checks in the
proper amount to the plaintiffs' lawyers. These awards will be deposited by
plaintiffs' lawyers and the principle will not be touched until after all ap-
peals have been settled. Only the interest will actually be given to the
plaintiffs themselves to tide them over until the "end" of the case.
Both sides have reasons to accede to this arrangement. Defendants
prefer it because:
1. It protects the major portion of the award from being "squan-
dered away" by plaintiffs of modest means who cannot repay
such amounts if they should lose on appeal;
2. It protects the companies from the embarrassment of a typically
well-publicized (often televised) visit to their headquarters by
court officials demanding payment of the award. By immediately
handing over the check in court, they minimize media sensation-
alism about their loss.
The plaintiffs' lawyers and organization leaders feel this arrangement
benefits their movement. For one thing, by putting control over the award
into the hands of the lawyers, the collective nature of the litigation is reaf-
firmed. In the Kita-tonari case, for example, 17 of the plaintiffs "lost" by
being denied any monetary compensation. But because all the others
21. Our interpretation notwithstanding, our discovery that plaintiff leaders and law-
yers consider delay advantageous may simply reflect the fact that only three years had passed
since filing of the litigation when we completed data collection in 1992. Delay could become
seriously disadvantageous if several more years pass before some kind of conclusion, a point
we intend to monitor in future research.
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"won" and their winnings were pooled by this arrangement, the 17 losers
could be included in the overall dispersal of funds from the interest gener-
ated by the collected awards. The "deal" thereby defeats the individualiz-
ing effects of the legal system's procedures and juridical definitions.
Second, prior experience has taught movement leaders that individ-
ual plaintiffs tend to drift away from the movement as soon as they receive
awards in their lawsuits. By pooling the awards and dispersing the interest
on a collective basis, the group's leaders can forestall this disintegrative
tendency. This social movement logic also leads to the view that delay, in
itself, is not necessarily bad, so long as a sense of momentum can be main-
tained. Once engaged, litigation carries with it the threat that any truly
final outcome, whether victory or defeat, will pull the rug out from under
the movement.
In discussing this last bit of strategy with both plaintiffs' leaders and
their attorneys, we discovered potentially divisive differences between
them concerning both short- and long-range objectives. The discovery of
differences between lawyers and their clients is, in itself, not particularly
surprising. Previous studies have shown a variety of ways in which lawyer/
client interests diverge.22 Lawyers, for example, are depicted as agents of
compromise, bringing their clients into line with "the facts" of law, litiga-
tion, and what is realistic. Business clients resist the "legalizing" initiatives
of their own lawyers. Lawyer language mystifies the average client. There-
fore it should not be surprising to find lawyer/client disagreement in Ja-
pan. However, the situation here is different enough from already
published reports to warrant special attention, especially since it appears
to bear on our understanding of the "natural history" of this social
movement.
In our research, there is a longer-term dynamic between litigants and
their lawyers that suggests the flow of influence in both directions. For one
thing, the "interests" 23 of plaintiffs in this kind of case vary greatly from
one plaintiff to another. These differences must somehow be reconciled if
the litigation project is to proceed. We have found that four different
22. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, "Law and Strategy in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office," 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 93 (1986); Stewart Macaulay, "Lawyers and Con-
sumer Protection Law," 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 161 (1979); Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce
Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in
America (New York: Free Press, 1985); William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, "Lay Expecta-
tions of the Civil Justice System," 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 137 (1988).
23. Wilhelm Aubert, "Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts: The Case of the Small
Industrialized Society" in Laura Nader, ed., Law in Culture and Society (Chicago: Aldine,
1969). Here Aubert proposed distinguishing between conflicts of interest and conflicts of
value. Dispute transformation literature has presented this dichotomy as a dimension along
which lawyers try to move conflicts from the more intractable value side toward the resolva-
ble side of interests. As the following discussion demonstrates, actions in the Kojoshi case
do not neatly support either the distinction between conflicts of interest and of value or the
view of lawyers as agents deemphasizing values.
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kinds of concerns and interests motivate plaintiffs in the Kojoshi case and
that these create different and potentially conflicting sources of reaction to
what the lawyers are doing. First are what we call Money Crusaders (MCs).
These plaintiffs seek nothing more than a quick and lucrative settlement
and have marginal involvement in the movement. One such plaintiff read-
ily admitted that he joined the victims' organization just so he could liti-
gate. He had had no previous interest in the movement but assumed that
membership in the larger organization was a prerequisite for membership
in the litigants' group.2 4 For Money Crusaders, the machinations of law-
yers making arrangements that exploit delay to invigorate the movement
would be seen as irrelevant or counterproductive if they knew of them. But
their involvement is so marginal that they simply bide their time and "fill
in the forms" in order to keep their place in the legal proceedings. MCs
are also the most vulnerable to litigant attrition. Their desire for compen-
sation can be subverted by threats made by defendant companies against
their jobs, or against, for example, prospective spouses who can be scared
away from marriage by threats to their economic well-being.
We call the second type of litigant the Local Crusader (LC). LCs see
the monetary outcome as significant only for its symbolic value. They seek
justice. They want a "final reckoning" with the specific adversaries they
have taken to court. Victory in court is only one of the ways they seek to
achieve this. They will also join in demonstrations at company offices and
participate in "for television only" actions that they see as building pres-
sure on defendants to "do the right thing." For this group, the larger-
frame strategies for sustaining the social movement are potentially at vari-
ance with their own pursuit of closure, of final justice. Yet their more ideo-
logical involvement means that their aims must be accommodated in the
litigation plans so that their participation will continue.
A third, much smaller group we call National Crusaders (NCs). Ideo-
logically similar to Lcs, but with a broader and longer range vision, NCs
treat the lawsuit as part of a process of engaging ordinary people in actions
which create, maintain, and, if possible, increase pressure on Japan's busi-
ness/government combine (what they see as a kind of Japanese "power
elite"). For them, litigation is part of an arsenal of actions that pressure
decision makers to rethink plans for development, expansion, economic
growth, and the negative environmental (and social) consequences.
Finally, among victim group leaders, whom we classify as World Cru-
saders (WCs), there is a broader agenda yet-that of mobilizing a global
environmental awareness and movement that will protect the environment
24. A litigants' group leader and a lawyer assured him (to his surprise) during the inter-
view that all victims, whether members of the larger association or not, had been welcome to
join the litigants' group as a litigant. His previous nonmembership in the umbrella victims'
group is simply an indication of his specific motives for involvement in the lawsuit.
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in general, not just in Japan. One Kojoshi leader recently spoke at an envi-
ronmental conference in Thailand because the national organization to
which she belongs has become concerned about the impact of Japanese
foreign aid and development projects on the environment in Southeast
Asia. Other members of the national federation were delegates to the June
1992 alternative Earth Summit staged in conjunction with the United Na-
tions environmental conference in Brazil.
For NCs and WCs, the tension with their lawyers comes from a differ-
ent kind of concern. Since they see the objective as lying beyond the limits
of their town and their lawsuit, they find the lawyers too focused on win-
ning their case rather than using it for the broader campaign. For them,
the delays in court are an opportunity to educate the lawyers on the case,
increase their general sensitivity to environmental issues, and expand the
overall involvement of the profession in the movement. They are aware of
the existence of the National Committee of Pollution Opposition Coun-
sels, which cooperates with the national victims' federation, and they seek
to draw their own district's lawyers into expanded participation in it.
Hence, what might have been a crisis in the case, a disabling illness to the
head of the lawyers' team, is actually, to victims' group leaders, an oppor-
tunity. The illness forced the redistribution of the head lawyer's work
among four other lawyers, and plaintiff group leaders view this as broaden-
ing the involvement of the legal profession in the case. "Now it is no
longer all in the head of one lawyer." Kojoshi victims' group leaders hope
to use their upcoming 10 years of litigation to raise their lawyers' con-
sciousness to the level they observed among lawyers in the Kita-tonari case.
They attribute the "better awareness" of Kita-tonari lawyers to their pro-
longed contact with Kita-tonari victims during their litigation.
For NCs and WCs, as for the lawyers, delay has value because it pro-
longs the involvement of MCs and LCs who are perceived as likely to
"drop out" once a judgment is rendered, unless the judgment can be con-
verted into further grounds for action.
There is irony in the beliefs of NCs and WCs that their lawyers need
motivating and educating. Several of these lawyers see themselves as part
of a long-term movement to pressure government on a wide variety of
"human rights" issues including environmental pollution. They see the
preservation of litigant interest, commitment, and involvement as both vi-
tal and problematic. It is true that they seek a good judgment for their
specific clients and achieving this demands many tedious hours of atten-
tion to detail. It is also true that they regard the delays in court as a poten-
tial threat to continued client involvement.25 However, they are now, and
25. Lawyers and movement leaders estimate that during the first three years of litiga-
tion about 10% of the plaintiffs had become "inactive." These are victims who have unoffi-
cially dropped out of the case, although their names remain on the roles as plaintiffs.
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have been for years, in close professional contact with a nationwide net-
work of lawyers working on cases involving pollution victims. Moreover,
several of them have been involved in similar litigation for at least the past
20 years. That is, their involvement in this kind of work dates back to that
point in Japan's postwar history when the "Big Four" pollution cases were
focusing the nation's attention on pollution specifically and the dangers of
unrestrained economic development more generally. Further, among their
role models for this kind of work are lawyers whose first clients were oppo-
nents of Japan's prewar military government, and who later went on to
lead the litigation in the "Big Four" pollution cases. An unbroken chain of
pollution cases has kept the basic issue before the courts almost continu-
ously since the 1960s, and one objective of lawyers involved in the Kojoshi
case is to "keep up the pressure" on government and industry to move
away from total commitment to economic development toward a greater
concern for other issues such as the environment.
From the perspective of lawyers with this longer-range view, there is a
persistent need to support and direct the Kojoshi movement and others
like it from above. Yet as we have already seen, a significant subset of
plaintiff leaders view the lawyers as too narrow in their thinking and com-
mitment. From both sides, however, we sense that the "poverty of re-
sources" within the Japanese legal system comes to serve as a potentially
valuable tool in long-range strategies of change.
Significantly for our comparison with the United States, all the law-
yers involved in the Kojoshi case, and lawyers we have interviewed who
were involved in some of the "Big Four" cases, say that they are not con-
cerned about setting legal precedents with their litigation. American law-
yers would describe their actions as designed either to take advantage of
precedents set in previous cases or to obtain judicial rulings that will set
new precedents favorable to their nationwide movement. Such rule mak-
ing is not an important goal in such cases in Japan.
While this is a significant verbal and conceptual difference between
Japanese and American lawyers, in practice it may be less significant, since
the overall Japanese oppositional strategy of maintaining a steady stream of
similar lawsuits appears to be designed to maintain an unavoidable pres-
ence in the political and governmental arena so that those forces inter-
ested in cutting back on environmental protection and victim
compensation will not be able to act without restraint.
Lawyers explain this phenomenon as a response to "pressure" put on plaintiffs by family
members and/or employers. Family members, for example, may find their search for a job or
a spouse being blocked because of their relative's involvement in litigation.
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CONCLUSION
Kojoshi is not unique in the pattern its antipollution citizens' move-
ment has followed. Even its use of litigation follows a model that we can
see in several previous cases. The persistence and repetition of this pattern
comes from the existence of an oppositional network involving profession-
als (including lawyers, doctors, and teachers) and a smaller number of
grass-roots leaders who are based in local groupings of the discontented,
such as the movement in Kojoshi. Litigation has, for those in the network,
become part of a strategy for organizing and expressing opposition to the
dominant political and economic tendencies of the postwar years. As such,
this type of litigation should be viewed as a form of political action whose
relevant outcomes are only partially determined by legal doctrine, the
structure of legal institutions, or the attitudes of judicial officers. Litigation
provides a means of assembling actors with disparate motives (all the way
from Money Crusaders to World Crusaders) into a force that places and
maintains environmental activism in the public arena. The apparent inad-
equacies of the Japanese legal system, its slow and inefficient courts, its
highly restricted legal profession, become part of the context that leaders
of social movements live with and use. Perhaps they would not object to a
swift, inexpensive court system that would rule sternly and regularly in
their favor. But leaders such as those in Kojoshi view litigation as useful
even without such a legal environment.
Are the lawyers and movement leaders involved in a conflict of inter-
est here against the ordinary members of the plaintiffs' group? From their
point of view, the answer is no. They see this group-based litigation as the
only effective way, given the severe resource restrictions of the Japanese
legal system, for any individual air pollution victim to exercise legal envi-
ronmental rights. In other words, an individual victim's only hope is to
contribute to the sustenance of the movement, and their specific role is
that of litigant. Therefore the lawyers' ability to exploit the reality of delay
is justified by its broader significance for all air pollution victims.
Hence, even though Japan has a tiny fraction of the number of law-
yers and courts available to activists in the United States, the Japanese
legal profession and legal institutions have become a partial but regular
contributor to the development of environmental protection conscious-
ness and action in Japan.
Returning to the issue of culture-based theories we discussed at the
outset, we view the pattern of Kojoshi-style action as evidence that cultural
difference, in this case Japan's predominance of particular conflict-avoid-
ance attitudes, provides a weak platform for understanding what we see.
Culture theorists2 6 have tried to explain law-related phenomena in Japan
26. Kawashima, "Dispute Resolution" (cited in note 5).
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as an expression of the pervasive emphasis on Wa, the value of harmony.
From such a perspective people avoid overt conflict to conform with the
value. The Kojoshi experience demonstrates quite clearly that noninvolve-
ment in litigation was primarily a function of the severe difficulties poten-
tial litigants faced in engaging the legal system on their side.
Viewing Japan through the culture lens has led some more recent ana-
lysts 27 to propose a dichotomy between behaviors that successfully pro-
mote the goal of harmony and behaviors that result in a kind of chaotic,
uncontrollable slide into "intensified conflict" 28 or conflict that is
uniquely "difficult to contain." 29 Their view is that societies which fail to
develop a rich ecology of dispute-handling alternatives, including rights-
based legal institutions, are "fragile," vulnerable to protracted, uncontain-
able conflicts when conditions prevent the preservation of harmony.
The Kojoshi litigation, and the pattern of other cases of which it is a
part, are neither an expression of Wa nor an example of conflict "difficult
to contain." The conflict is protracted and the behavior may appear at
first glance to be "unjapanese." However, we have shown that the actions
taken in Kojoshi are systematic, carefully and methodically planned, and
quite clearly defined in terms of objectives and strategies. These kinds of
lawsuits are part of an ongoing, overt pattern of conflict that expresses
class-based divisions in Japanese society. By focusing on Wa, culture-based
explanations divert attention from what may be much more important dif-
ferences between the social, economic, and political structures of Japan
and the United States, especially those concerning connections between
social class, political power, and the structure of legal institutions.
27. T. S. Lebra, "Nonconfrontational Strategies for Management of Interpersonal
Conflicts," in E. S. Krauss, T. P. Rohlen, &_ P. G. Steinhoff, eds., Conflict in Japan 41-60
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984) ("Lebra, 'Nonconfrontational Strategies' ");
Hamilton & Sanders, Everyday Justice (cited in note 7).
28. Lebra, "Nonconfrontational Strategies," at 56.
29. Hamilton & Sanders, Everyday Justice 214.
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APPENDIX
THE KOJOSHI LITIGANTS' LEGAL CASE
I. The Legal Issues
Article 719, Section 1 of the Japanese Civil Code provides that those who caused
damages to others through joint torts (kyodo Jiho Koi) are liable for compensation. Like
all other suits on air pollution, the Kojoshi litigation is based on this provision. The
plaintiffs have to prove two crucial elements: (1) the causation between air pollution
and their diseases; (2) whether the defendants' actions form joint torts.
On the issue of causation, previous decisions in pollution cases have developed
various methods to judge it. They commonly have two elements: the general causal
relationship and the specific causal relationship. First the plaintiffs must prove an epi-
demiological, general relationship between air pollution and diseases in the given area.
Second, the plaintiffs must prove, for each plaintiff, the specific relationship between
air pollution and diseases of the given plaintiff. This second element is often a main
point of the defense. However, these two elements appear to be related in court deci-
sions. When the evidence about the first element is strong, courts appear to lower the
level of proof on the second element. Probably because of this pattern, the complaint
filed by the Kojoshi plaintiffs includes claims about the first element, while it says al-
most nothing about the second element. (Plaintiff's lawyers in the Kojoshi case started
their investigation about specific diseases of the plaintiffs three years after the start of
the litigation.)
On the issue of joint torts, subjective elements such as conspiracy or shared per-
ceptions are not required for the defendants' actions to form joint torts. Even when
such subjective elements are lacking, the defendants' actions may be held to form joint
torts, while levels of contribution may vary. For instance, if a company continues to
operate its factories while knowing that the level of air pollution in the given area is
reaching a dangerous level and that its factories are a small part of the pollution
sources, the company may be held liable for joint torts in a weak sense. The company
may argue for a reduction of its responsibility compared to larger pollution sources. If,
on the other hand, a group of companies in the area operates with close financial and
personnel relationships and if they are all pollution sources, they may be held liable for
joint torts in a strong sense. Each of them may be held liable for the entire damages.
The plaintiffs' complaint argues that the defendants should be held liable in this
stronger sense, for they have continued their operation while clearly knowing the situa-
tion for many years. If the defendants' actions are held to form joint torts, the plaintiffs
will have no need to prove specific liability of each defendant. The defense, of course,
argues that the defendants' actions do not form joint torts even in a weaker sense.
Arguing that there is a causal relationship between air pollution and their diseases
and that the defendants are liable for joint torts, the plaintiffs seek (1) injunction and
(2) monetary awards. In their claim for injunction, the plaintiffs argue that while there
are other sources of pollution, the defendants are the largest contributors and the level
of pollution will be much improved by controlling their emissions. In the claim for
monetary awards, there is an element that is unique to the Kojoshi litigation.
Compensation for damages generally includes two elements: (1) compensation of
lost interests (isshitsu rieki) and other monetary damages and (2) compensation of psy-
chological damages (isharyo). While the plaintiffs of other cases sought both, the
Kojoshi plaintiffs sought only the latter plus lawyers' fees. Thus, the amounts sought by
the Kojoshi plaintiffs are lower than those in other cases, only up to 30 million yen,
compared to 50 million yen in the Kita-tonari litigation. This self-imposed limitation
reflects prior court decisions that deducted the money the plaintiff received under the
Pollution Victim Compensation Law from the monetary award the plaintiff might have
received by the court decision. Therefore, it was quite possible that the plaintiff might
receive nothing from the court decision because he had previously received too much
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under the Compensation Law. However, scholars argue that the amount of compensa-
tion under the Compensation Law is set at 80% of the income, so that it does not
include compensation of psychological damages. Probably because of this considera-
tion, the Kojoshi plaintiffs sought only isharyo compensation, which is arguably im-
mune from deduction. While their amounts may look too small to American eyes, they
reflect prevailing judicial decisions in Japan.
Looking at it this way, we may say that the Kojoshi and similar cases in Japan also
seek to establish new precedents, albeit in an extremely piecemeal way. Easing the re-
quirements on causation or joint torts will be an improvement for plaintiffs. Persuading
the court on the need and enforceability of injunction as a legal remedy will be a tre-
mendous victory. Even the holding that compensations under the Compensation Law
do not include isharyo will be progress. In a country where the judiciary is extremely
positivistic (in the sense of legal positivism), a small doctrinal increment is often the
most that plaintiffs can expect to achieve.
I. Issues and Awards in the Kita-tonari Case
While the Kojoshi plaintiffs limited their claims to isharyo, the Kita-tonari plaintiffs
sought the so-called comprehensive claim (hokatsu seikyu) plus lawyers' fees, without
specifying monetary and psychological damages. Their claims varied between 20 mil-
lion yen (for a living minor) and 50 million yen (for deceased).
The court first held that there were two main causal mechanisms of air pollution
in the area, one caused by sources located in the southwestern part of the area, the
other caused by sources in the northeastern part. The 10 defendant companies were all
located in the southwestern part and, thus, are liable for only half of the damages
before 1969. Then the court held that since there were other sources of pollution, the
defendant companies contributed to less than 35% of pollution in 1970 and less than
20% in 1973. Each defendant's liability to each plaintiff was to be calculated according
to this scheme. Furthermore, the court took into consideration the compensation each
plaintiff had already received under the Compensation Law and under a neighboring
major city's ordinance and deducted part of such compensation from the total amount
of award each plaintiff should receive. Thus, the court held that seven plaintiffs had
already been fully compensated.
As defendants, the government and the highway corporation were held not liable
in the court's decision. The key to this decision was the problem of proving causation.
The court held that while the causal relationship between sulfur dioxide (from factories
and power plants) and the diseases was proven, there was no proof of the causal rela-
tionship between nitrogen dioxide (from highway traffic) and disease. Thus only the 10
companies were left as liable defendants.
The court held, moreover, that the defendant companies were liable for only part
of the damages and that part of this limited liability had already been covered by other
compensation schemes. The net result was 357 million yen (about $3.36 million),
which was only about 3 million yen ($28,000) for each plaintiff.
The basic problem behind all this is the way in which Japanese courts estimate the
value of human life. We should note that the maximum compensation sought for de-
ceased victims was only 50 million yen. This reflects the going rate in court decisions.
Moreover, since the defendant companies are only part of the cause, they compensate
only part of the entire amount. Therefore, monetary compensation is only a small part
of the plaintiff team's calculation of success or failure of the litigation. More important
is the achievement of a finding that there are uncompensated pollution victims and the
development of legal doctrines that would make this type of litigation slightly more
winnable.

